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Abstract
A seller has an object for sale and can reach buyers only through intermediaries, who
also have privileged information about buyers’ valuations. Intermediaries can either
mediate the transaction by buying the object and reselling it–the merchant model–or
refer buyers to the seller and release information for a fee–the agency model. The
merchant model suffers from double marginalization. The agency model suffers from
adverse selection: Intermediaries would like to refer low-value buyers, but retain high-
value ones and make profits from resale. We show that, in equilibrium, intermediaries
specialize in agency. Seller’s and intermediaries’ joint profits equal the seller’s profits
when he has access to all buyers and all intermediaries’ information. Profits’ divi-
sion depends on seller’s and intermediaries’ relative bargaining power. Our results
rationalize the prevalence of the agency model in online markets.
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Intermediaries often facilitate transactions between sellers and buyers.1 For example, online
travel agents (OTAs) such as Expedia, Priceline, and Orbitz connect buyers to hoteliers,
airlines and car rental agencies. Amazon marketplace, Groupon, and alike, connect buyers
to retailers selling a variety of goods. Amazon and Apple intermediate the E-books industry.
Facebook connects potential buyers to retailers by selling targeted advertising. Google links
direct users searching for a particular product to retailers. Intermediation is also prevalent in
offline markets such as real estate, art, used cars, books, as well as markets for professional
services. Intermediaries have two main advantages compared to producers and retailers:
access to many potential customers and privileged information about their tastes.2
Intermediaries predominately operate under two business models (or hybrids of those).
Under the agency business model, they refer buyers to sellers, who then negotiate directly on
the terms of trade. In return, intermediaries receive referral fees for the creation of the match
and/or commissions based on final sale. Under the more traditional wholesaler/merchant
model, intermediaries buy the good from the suppliers and resell it to consumers.
In the online travel industry, Priceline makes most of its revenue through the agency
model (almost 80 percent from agency, and the rest from acting as a merchant). Price-
line’s subsidiary Booking.com is an agency-based business, while its subsidiary Agoda is a
merchant-based business.3 Expedia operates mainly under the merchant model–receiving
roughly 75 percent of its revenue through the merchant model and some 21 percent through
the agency model.4 Recently, Expedia has expanded its agency business by acquiring the
agency-based online hotel business Venere. Orbitz’s net revenue stems fairly evenly from its
air and hotel businesses (34 and 29 percent respectively), with its revenue from the hotel
business coming mainly from the merchant model.5 In the E-book industry, Apple oper-
ates under the agency model, whereas Amazon started with a merchant model and recently
adopted an agency model. The agency model is widely used in the marketplace for tablets
and smart-phone applications. Facebook and Google can be also thought of as operating
1According to Spulber (1996), intermediation in its various forms accounted for about 25 percent of U.S.
GDP in 1993.
2The recent advance in information technology allows intermediaries to manage large data sets on past
consumers’ behavior, information that may not directly available to sellers. Moreover, large intermediaries
are also likely to have more-accurate information about consumers’ trends compared to small producers or
retailers.
3For more details, see Business Insider (2012) and priceline.com, Inc. (2011)
4Expedia, Inc. (2013, p.10)
5Orbitz Worldwide Inc. (2012, p.35). Orbitz also owns OTAs such as CheapTickets and ebookers.
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under an agency model. The agency model is also used in more-traditional markets such as
real estate and markets for professionals (actors, artists, sports players). The proliferation
of social media has also increased the implementation of marketing strategies based on the
agency model–e.g., affiliate and referral marketing.6 The merchant model is the standard
for classic wholesalers and retailers.
The merchant model suffers from a double-marginalization problem: The seller exercises
market power against intermediaries who, in turn, exercise it against buyers. As a conse-
quence, the joint profit of seller and intermediaries is less than the seller’s profit if he had
access to all buyers’ and intermediaries’ information. In contrast, once the agency model is
in place, the seller and the buyers can negotiate directly, thereby overcoming this problem.
There is, however, a potential adverse-selection problem: Intermediaries have incentives to
adopt a hybrid model in which they refer only low-value buyers and retain high-value buyers
with the hope of extracting high margins from resale. Our paper studies how these forces
shape the market. We clarify the conditions under which intermediaries specialize in agency
and when we should expect to observe a co-existence of the two business models. We also
study the welfare consequences of the two models and consider the implications of our results
for policy debates on vertical agreements.
In our model, there is a seller with one object for sale. The seller is in contact with a
number of intermediaries, and each intermediary has private information about the set of
buyers he has access to and about their valuations. The seller and the intermediaries have
no consumption value for the object. We study the following game. At the outset, the seller
and the intermediaries negotiate the level of the referral fee. The referral fee determines
the payment to each intermediary per referred buyer. In the referral phase, intermediaries
decide which buyers to refer. Once a buyer is referred, the seller deals directly with him. In
the trading phase, the seller sells the object to the intermediaries and the referred buyers. If
a buyer obtains the object, the game ends. If an intermediary obtains the object, then the
intermediary sells it optimally to the buyers he has not referred.
Our first result is that when the referral fee is positive, in all equilibria, intermediaries refer
all their buyers to the seller regardless of their private information about buyers (Theorem 1).
Hence, even arbitrarily small referral fees lead intermediaries to specialize in agency, despite
6Affiliate marketing is a performance-based marketing in which a business rewards one or more affiliates
for each visitor or customer brought in by the affiliate’s own marketing efforts (see Hoffman and Novak,
2000). According to a recent Forrester estimate (Forrester Research, 2012), U.S. affiliate online marketing
spending will increase by a compound annual growth rate of nearly 17 percent between 2011 and 2016,
growing to $4.5 billion.
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the fact that they can always choose the merchant model of buying and reselling. To see
this, consider a simple example of one intermediary with one buyer; the intermediary knows
the buyer’s valuation, but the seller knows only that it is either high or low. Since the seller
behaves optimally when selling the good, the intermediary anticipates that the price asked
by the seller is always weakly above the buyer’s lowest valuation. Then, an intermediary
with a low-value buyer always prefers to refer and receive the positive referral fee. Hence,
upon observing no referral, the seller infers that the intermediary has a high value-buyer
and, therefore, asks a high price, leaving zero profit for the intermediary. This unraveling
force implies that there is no equilibrium in which the intermediary is active with positive
probability in the resale market.
Once intermediaries are specialized in agency, we show that the seller, using a small
commission fee, can extract the intermediary’s information at virtually no cost.7 This, in
combination with the previous result, implies (Theorem 2) that the aggregate equilibrium
profit of the seller and the intermediaries equals the expected revenue that the seller achieves
when he has access to all buyers’ and all intermediaries’ information–which we call the
“integrated-industry profit.”
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 show that the possibility of referrals leads intermediaries to
adopt the agency model, and this specialization removes possible distortions arising from
intermediation via resale. In particular, the presence of referrals/commissions in our model,
and in trading environments more generally, may generate an outcome that is equivalent
to that obtained through an explicit vertical agreement, such as a royalty contract. This
is of interest to policy makers and competition authorities, who are often concerned that
vertical contracts may restrict competition and decrease aggregate welfare.8 In Section
6, we show that, in a number of important cases, the presence of referrals/commissions
unambiguously increases (ex-ante) aggregate welfare relative to a situation where there is a
ban on referrals/commissions.
Our results not only speak to the prevalence of the agency model in online markets,
but can also account for the large heterogeneity in the level of referral fees/commissions.
7In the example with one perfectly informed intermediary and one buyer, the seller asks the intermediary
to report his private information about the value, commits to ask the buyer a price that equals to the
reported value, and pays the intermediary a percentage of his final revenue. The interests of the seller and
of the intermediary are perfectly aligned.
8See Rey (2003) for an extensive survey of the academic literature on vertical restraints and an account
of the legal issues related to vertical restraints in the United States and the European Union. We also refer
to Johnson (2013a,b), for an analysis of the agency and the merchant model in terms of consumer surplus.
In contrast to Johnson (2013a,b), in our general analysis, which business model is used is endogenous.
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We show that when the seller has the all bargaining power to set referral fees, then, in
equilibrium, referral fees are zero (i.e., are set at marginal cost of referring), the seller obtains
the integrated industry profit, and intermediaries are left with no rent (Theorem 3). However,
when intermediaries have the bargaining power to set the referral fees, intermediaries can
extract as much as their marginal contribution to the integrated industry profit (Theorem 4).
These findings are consistent with what we observe: An industry report on the online
travel agent industry indicates that the typical OTA commissions in the three major travel
sectors are as follows: Airlines $0, Car Rental $0, Hotels $50-$150 (based on Average Daily
Rate of $100− $300).9 Practitioners attribute these differences mainly to differences in the
bargaining power of sellers (airlines, car rental companies, hoteliers) vis-a`-vis intermediaries
(the OTAs) when it comes to negotiating fees.
Our results that revenue from referrals depends on bargaining power may help improve
the pricing of stocks in IPOs of companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Lore.com or Pinterest,
whose business models are very different from the traditional ones. These companies start
offering the service for free with the objective of maximizing the number of users. Then,
they leverage their access to individuals and function as intermediaries to various sellers. On
the one hand, our analysis predicts that if sellers have stronger bargaining power vis-a`-vis
these companies, we should expect their revenues from referrals to be low. On the other
hand, when intermediaries have stronger bargaining power, they can expect higher revenues
from referrals.
In the last part of the paper, we explore the limits of our result on intermediaries’
specialization in agency (Section 7). To break this specialization result, we need to intro-
duce additional frictions that prevent the seller from extracting intermediaries’ revenue from
resale. Such frictions include budget-constrained intermediaries; intermediaries who have
positive consumption value; and strong restrictions on the selling procedures that the seller
can adopt. In such environments, when referral fees are small, intermediaries may prefer
not to refer high-value buyers and make positive profit in the resale market. This is possible
even though the seller anticipates that high-value buyers are not referred. In equilibrium,
then, intermediaries adopt a hybrid business model that involves both agency and merchant
activities.
9See the Table on page 4 of that report Starkov (2010).
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1.1 Literature Review
Although there is an extensive literature on intermediation, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no systematic work that examines the interplay between the option to intermediate
trade via matching the buyer and the seller (agency-model) and the option to intermediate
trade by buying and reselling (merchant-model). We complement the existing literature by
studying the trade-offs generated by these two business models and highlight basic mecha-
nisms that can help explain the prevalence of the agency model in many online and offline
markets.
One function of intermediaries often highlighted by the literature is to decrease the search
costs of buyers and sellers (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987; Yavas, 1992, 1994, 1996;
Gehrig, 1993; Watanabe, 2010, 2013; Johri and Leach, 2002; Shevchenko, 2004; Smith, 2004;
Shi and Siow, 2012). The basic premise of this literature is that there are frictions that
may prevent buyers and sellers from transacting, and that intermediaries are endowed with
a technology that reduces frictions. For example, intermediaries can hold inventories so that
they improve matches between buyers and sellers. These models involve random matching
and abstract away from problems of asymmetric information, focusing on the circumstances
in which intermediation occurs.
Another part of the literature emphasizes the role of intermediaries in certifying the
quality of goods, which is known to the sellers but not to the buyers, (e.g., Milgrom, 1981;
Shavell, 1994; Lizzeri, 1999; Jovanovic, 1982; Biglaiser, 1993; Li, 1998; Inderst and Ottaviani,
2012). We share with this literature the emphasis on asymmetric information among sellers,
intermediaries and buyers, as well as an explicit model on how this information can be
aggregated. However, our focus is on the asymmetric information between the seller and
the intermediaries with respect to buyers’ valuations, and, in our model, the aggregation of
information occurs via referrals.
Our work is also related to the literature on resale, (Calzolari and Pavan, 2006; Zheng,
2002; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1999, e.g.) and the literature on intermediation in networks
(e.g., Blume et al., 2007; Condorelli and Galeotti, 2012; Nava, 2012). In these papers, a seller
can negotiate with a subset of buyers, who, in turn, can negotiate with other buyers. These
works focus on understanding how the possibility of resale affects the seller’s incentives and
the possible inefficiencies that resale markets may introduce. Referrals are not possible.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on referrals. Arbatskaya and Konishi (2012)
and Park (2005) focus on horizontal referrals in models in which consumers try to find
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products matched to their tastes. Park (2005) looks at the interaction between customers
and experts in an infinitely repeated game, in which experts’ referrals are modeled as cheap
talk. Garicano and Santos (2004) focus on vertical referrals by looking at the matching
between agents and opportunities. Montgomery (1991) and Galenianos (2012) study the
effects of allowing firms to hire through referrals for labor-market outcomes. In these two
papers, hiring through a referral means hiring a social contact of a current employee. We are
interested in the role of referrals in markets where trade can be intermediated and there is
asymmetric information, and so our model of referral and the questions we pose are different
from these works’.
2 An Illustrative Example
We develop a simple example to illustrate the main findings of the paper. All the results
hold in the context of a more general model, which is introduced in Section 3.
In this example, the seller has an object for sale and is connected to one intermediary, who
is connected to one buyer. The valuation of the buyer for the object is vB ∈ {vL, vH}, with
0 < vL < vH ; the seller believes that vB = vH with probability f > 0 and the intermediary
knows vB. The seller and the intermediary derive no utility from consuming the object.
2.1 Merchant Model
Suppose, first, that the seller can trade only via the intermediary. If the intermediary does
not acquire the object, the game ends. Otherwise, the intermediary becomes the new owner
of the object and resells to the buyer.
It is optimal for the seller to post a price equal to vL if vL > fvH and a price equal to vH
otherwise. The intermediary accepts the offer if, and only if, the price is lower than or equal
to vB. If the intermediary acquires the object, he asks a price equal to vB from the buyer,
who accepts the offer.
Result 1 Suppose that the seller can trade only via the intermediary. The ex-ante expected
profit of the seller is Π = max{vL, fvH}. The seller does not attain all the available surplus:
if vL > fvH , the intermediary makes a profit when vB = vH ; if vL < fvH , the outcome is
inefficient when vB = vL.
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2.2 Agency Model: the Role of Referrals
In the agency model, the intermediary receives a referral fee κ > 0 if he refers the buyer
to the seller. Given κ, the intermediary decides whether or not to refer the buyer. If the
intermediary does not refer the buyer, the seller can sell only to the intermediary, and the
game proceeds as in the previous section. If the intermediary refers the buyer, then the seller
pays κ to the intermediary and trades directly with the buyer.
Our main result is that when the possibility of referrals is present, in equilibrium, the
intermediary specializes in agency.
Result 2 (Unraveling) In every equilibrium, the intermediary refers his buyer regardless
of his type.
The intermediary must always refer the low-valuation buyer because if the buyer is not
referred, the seller will ask the intermediary for a price that is at least as high as vL. In
light of this, the intermediary must also refer the high-value buyer. Suppose that this is
not the case; then, since the intermediary always refers the low-value buyer, the seller, upon
non-referral, infers that the buyer has a high value and so asks the intermediary for a price
vH .
Even if the intermediary provides access to his buyer at virtually no cost, the intermediary
still retains all information about his buyer’s valuation. However, once the buyer has been
referred, the seller can extract the intermediary’s information using an arbitrarily small
commission fee: The seller asks the intermediary to report the buyer’s value; commits to
ask the buyer for a price that equals to the reported value; and pays the intermediary a
percentage of his final revenue. The interests of the seller and of the intermediary become
perfectly aligned. Let Π∗ = fvH + (1 − f)vL be the “integrated-industry profit.” Since
the intermediary has complete information about buyers’ valuation, the integrated-industry
profit equals total surplus.
Result 3 (Integrated-Industry Profit) The ex-ante expected aggregate profit of the seller
and the intermediary equals the integrated-industry profit. The seller obtains Π∗− κ and the
intermediary gets κ.
2.3 Endogenous referral fee
So far, the referral fee has been treated as positive and exogenous. Next, we consider referral
fees that arise as the result of a negotiation between the seller and the intermediary.
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First, consider a scenario in which the seller has all the bargaining power in setting the
referral fee. In particular, suppose that at the beginning of the game, the seller announces
a referral fee κ ≥ 0, and then the game proceeds as in the previous section. We know from
Result 3 that if the seller announces κ, then he obtains Π∗ − κ. Since the seller can choose
κ, we have:
Result 4 (Referral fees set by seller) Consider the game in which the seller announces
referral fees. In every equilibrium, the seller obtains the all integrated industry profit Π∗.
When the seller organizes referrals, the intermediary is left with no rent. In this case, if
the intermediary has the ability to commit to not referring his buyers, he will choose to do
so.
Second, we now endow the intermediary with the power to propose the referral fee. In
particular, the intermediary proposes a referral fee and the seller decides whether or not to
accept it. If the seller rejects the referral fee, we move to the game described in Section 2.1.
If the seller accepts, we move to the game described in Section 2.2. Our main result is that
there is a class of equilibria where the joint profit of the seller and the intermediary equals
the integrated-industry profit Π∗.
Result 5 (Referral fees set by intermediary) Consider the game in which the interme-
diary announces referral fees. There is a class of equilibria where the intermediary proposes
κ∗ ∈ [0,Π∗ − Π], the seller accepts κ∗ and the intermediary refers the buyer. The aggregate
payoff of seller and intermediary is the integrated-industry profit Π∗, and the intermediary
gets κ∗.
2.4 Summary
The analysis of this example reveals that, in equilibrium, the agency model prevails. More-
over, the seller and the intermediary jointly achieve the highest possible profit available, given
their information. Therefore, distortions typical of trading environments in which interme-
diaries act as merchants are absent. How the value added by referrals is shared between the
seller and the intermediary depends on their bargaining power when negotiating the referral
scheme.




The seller of an indivisible object is connected to a set of intermediaries, I, and each inter-
mediary i ∈ I is linked to a set of buyers Bi. Intermediary i privately observes the set Bi
that is drawn from a finite set of potential buyers Bi.
10 Intermediaries have exclusive access
to their buyers–that is, Bi ∩ Bi′ = ∅ for all i, i
′ ∈ I, i 6= i′. The assignment of buyers to
intermediaries is independent across intermediaries.
All agents are risk-neutral. The seller and the intermediaries derive zero utility from
consuming the object. All potential buyers have strictly positive and independent private
consumption values. The consumption value of buyer j, denoted vj, is drawn from a distri-
bution with support in a bounded measurable subset of the positive real line. We assume
that all values are independently drawn.
Intermediary i observes a signal sji about j’s valuation, for each buyer j ∈ Bi. Only
intermediary i and buyer j observe the signal sji . The number of possible signals about each
buyer is finite; si denotes the vector of signals that intermediary i observes about his buyers
Bi. A type of intermediary i is ti = (si, Bi), and Ti is the set of possible types. Anything
that it is not privately observed is common knowledge.
There is a referral fee κi ≥ 0 that determines the payment to intermediary i ∈ I per
referred buyer. It is natural to think that the referral fee κ results from negotiations between
the seller and the intermediaries. Initially, we take the referral fee κi as exogenous and derive
a set of results that hold regardless of how the fee is determined. In Section 5, we endogenize
the referral fee by examining alternative bargaining scenarios.
We look for perfect Bayesian equilibria of the following game:
Referral Phase. Given κi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I, intermediaries simultaneously decide the
subset of buyers they want to refer; Bˆi denotes the set of buyers referred by intermediary i.
Intermediary i with type ti = (si, Bi) can refer only a subset of his buyers in Bi. The seller
observes the set of referred buyers and pays each intermediary an amount equal to the referral
fee times the number of buyers he has referred. We do not impose any restriction on what
intermediaries and buyers observe about the set of buyers referred by other intermediaries.
However, we maintain that each intermediary always observes at least what is observed by
his buyers and that it is common knowledge who observes what.
10This implies that a buyer of intermediary i does not observe who else is connected to i. This assumption
is not essential.
10
Trading Phase. Stage 1 (Sale): The seller selects a selling procedure to sell the object to
intermediaries and to referred buyers. The game ends if no trade takes place or if a buyer
gets the good. However, if an intermediary i ∈ I acquires the object, the game proceeds to
the following resale stage.
Stage 2 (Resale): If an intermediary i ∈ I acquires the object, he selects a mechanism
to resell the object to the buyers that he has not referred. The game ends at the end of the
resale phase, regardless of whether or not trade takes place.
We do not impose any restriction on what intermediaries and buyers observe, apart from
the assumption that, in the sale phase, an intermediary always observes at least what his
buyers observe and that it is common knowledge who observes what.
We assume that the seller and intermediariers propose direct incentive-compatible mech-
anisms that satisfy voluntary participation. Our results do not depend on the fact that the
seller and the intermediary can choose any selling procedure: They hold for much simpler
and more natural selling procedures, such as auctions with optimally-chosen reserve prices
and sequential take-it-or-leave it offers, among others. We clarify this in Section 4; in Section
7, we develop an example in which the seller and intermediaries can only post a uniform
price.
4 Equilibrium Referrals: Agency Prevails
Our first result shows that, as long as referral fees are positive, in equilibrium, each inter-
mediary refers all his buyers. Thus the equilibrium predicts intermediaries’ specialization in
agency. The driving force is that the seller will never sell the good to an intermediary at a
price that allows all intermediaries’ types to obtain a strictly positive profit from reselling.
Thus, among types that do not refer, there must be one that obtains zero profit from re-
sale. As long as the referral fee is positive, this type strictly prefers to refer. Hence, every
equilibrium in which an intermediary refers some but not all buyers unravels.
Theorem 1 (Unraveling) Suppose that κi > 0 for all i ∈ I. In every equilibrium, all
intermediaries refer all their buyers to the seller regardless of their types.
Proof We prove the result in three steps: Step 1 introduces the notation required to prove
Lemma 1, which is the core of Step 2. Step 3 uses Lemma 1 to conclude the proof.
Step 1: Resale Types. At any history following referrals, the seller’s posterior belief about
some intermediary i depends on the prior, on the set of referred buyers Bˆi, and on i’s referral
11
strategy. Let Ti(Bˆi) ⊆ Ti denote the support of the seller’s posterior.
We denote by R(ti, Bˆi) the expected revenue from resale of intermediary i with type
ti ∈ Ti(Bˆi). The resale value R(ti, Bˆi) depends on ti and on the set of buyers that i has
referred Bˆi.
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We define the set T ∗i (Bˆi) ≡ {ti ∈ Ti(Bˆi) : Bˆi ( Bi and Ri(ti, Bˆi) > 0} as the sub-
set Ti(Bˆi) that contains all the types that have strictly positive resale values. When-
ever T ∗i (Bˆi) is not empty, we define ti(Bˆi) as the type with the lowest resale value–i.e.,
ti(Bˆi) = argminti∈T ∗i (Bˆi)
R(ti, Bˆi).
Step 2: Lowest type makes zero. At the beginning of the trading stage, the seller chooses
an incentive-compatible direct mechanism that satisfies participation constraints (i.e., pro-
vides payoff higher than or equal to zero to all participants). In our setup, participants
are intermediaries and buyers. Buyer i’s type is his valuation vi and, henceforth, we write
ti ≡ vi when agent i is a buyer. When the participating agent is an intermediary, his type is
ti ≡ (si, Bi) in Ti(Bˆi).
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Given a vector of reports ti, t−i from all agents, let pi (ti, t−i) be the expected probability
that i gets the good and let xi (ti, t−i) be the expected payment.
13 Then, under truth-telling,
the expected continuation payoff of an intermediary i of type ti = (si, Bi) who has referred
Bˆi is:
Ui (ti) = Et−i
[
pi (ti, t−i)Ri(ti, Bˆi)− xi (ti, t−i)
]
, (1)
where expectation is taken using the posterior belief of the intermediary, which is known to
the seller and is independent of ti.
Lemma 1 Consider any equilibrium history of the game where intermediary i has referred a







11The resale value is the revenue corresponding to the revenue-maximizing mechanism chosen by the inter-
mediary. Because intermediaries may have superior information relative to the buyers, this is a mechanism
design problem by an informed principal. Theorem 6 in Skreta (2011) implies that the intermediaries’ maxi-
mum expected revenue is the same whether or not the buyers know the intermediary’s information. McAfee
and McMillan (1987) establish a version of this result for the case when the intermediary’s (seller’s) infor-
mation is the number of buyers. Hence, we can treat this as a standard mechanism design problem where
the principal has no private information.
12The results in footnote 11 imply that the seller’s maximum expected revenue is the same whether or not
his information is common knowledge. Hence, we do not specify the private information of a buyer arising
from observations made during the game, given that these observations are known to the seller.
13From McAfee and McMillan (1987), it follows that it is without loss of generality to assume that all
participants know who participates.
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Proof See Appendix A.
Step 3: Unraveling. Let κi > 0 and suppose, to derive a contradiction, that, in equilib-
rium, there is a type ti = (si, Bi) of an intermediary i who refers a subset of buyers Bˆi ( Bi
with positive probability. This implies that there exists a history where the seller observes
Bˆi and the set T
∗
i (Bˆi) is not empty. In order for intermediary type ti(Bˆi) to find it profitable










∣∣∣ is the number of buyers that the intermediary type ti(Bˆi) did not refer to
the seller. This contradicts (2).
Theorem 1 generalizes well beyond the model described in Section 3. The result holds if
the seller is forced to use simple selling procedures, as long as they leave no rent to the lowest
resale value intermediary who participates in the resale market (i.e., Lemma 1 holds). This
is the case if, for example, after referral, the seller offers the intermediaries a commission to
report their types and commits to a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers, or to use auctions
with individualized reserve prices. The result can also be easily extended to the case where
buyers’ values are statistically correlated or there are multiple objects for sale. The analysis
can be also modified to incorporate fixed costs associated with referring a buyer.
The unraveling result may fail, instead, if all types of an intermediary who have positive
resale value (even the lowest one) make a profit from acquiring and reselling the good.
Section 7 explores a number of environments in which Theorem 1 fails and, as a consequence,
intermediaries adopt a hybrid business model in equilibrium.
Theorem 1 shows that, in equilibrium, intermediaries specialize in agency. Since interme-
diaries are pooling in their referral strategy, the set of referred buyers does not convey any
information to the seller about their valuations. Therefore, after the referral phase, inter-
mediaries still possess private information that is valuable to the seller. Can intermediaries
extract profits from this information?
The answer is no. Once the seller is connected to all buyers, the intermediaries’ informa-
tion becomes payoff-irrelevant to them, and the seller can acquire it at no cost. For instance,
the seller can offer a very small fraction of his final revenue to intermediaries in exchange for
their information, while committing to use the information to optimize his sale to the buy-
ers. When this mechanism is used, the seller’s and the intermediaries’ interests are aligned,
and intermediaries have an incentive to report their information correctly. The use of such
13
commission fees is widespread in industries in which the price between buyers and seller is
negotiable, and intermediaries have relevant information about buyers’ preferences (e.g., in
real estate, online markets, etc.).
We call integrated-industry profit, denoted Π∗, the revenue that the seller achieves ex-
ante when he expects to receive all signals from the intermediaries and to have access to all
buyers. The unraveling result, together with the mechanism outlined above, suggest that,





using commission fee α, where E[|Bi|] denotes the seller’s prior expected number of buyers
of intermediary i. Hence, given that the seller is free to pick α arbitrarily small, we obtain
the following result.
Theorem 2 Suppose that κi > 0 for all i ∈ I. In every equilibrium, the ex-ante expected
joint payoff of seller and the intermediaries is the integrated-industry profit Π∗. The ex-ante
expected equilibrium payoff of the seller is Π∗ −
∑
i κiE[|Bi|], while intermediary i obtains
κiE[|Bi|].
Proof See appendix A.
The result of Theorem 2–i.e., that all buyers are referred and information is aggregated
in such a way that integrated-industry profits are achieved (jointly by the intermediaries and
the seller)–is robust. For instance, we can obtain an analogous result if we write a model
in which the referral fee represents a percentage κi of the final seller’s revenue and, in the
referral phase, we allow intermediaries to, in addition to referring their buyers, also send a
(cheap talk) message about buyers’ type. The analysis of this case can be found in an online
appendix (Appendix B).
5 Endogenous referral fee
It is natural to think that the level of the referral fee κi is the result of a negotiation between
the seller and the intermediaries. In this section, we consider two polar bargaining scenarios,
one in which the seller proposes the referral fees and another in which intermediaries propose.
The former case captures environments in which the seller has more bargaining power than
the intermediaries, while the latter captures environments in which the bargaining power is
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more concentrated on the intermediaries’ side. Our main finding is that when the seller has
bargaining power, referral fees will be equal to the marginal cost of referring a buyer (i.e.,
zero in our model), while when intermediaries have bargaining power, they can extract the
value of their access to buyers and their information.
5.1 Bargaining power to the seller
Consider a variant of the model in Section 3, in which prior to the referral phase, the seller
publicly proposes a referral fee κi ≥ 0 that determines the payment to intermediary i ∈ I,
per referred buyer. After the announcement, the game proceeds as described in Section 3.





(recall that E[|Bi|] is the expected number of buyers of intermediary i given the seller’s prior,
and Π∗ is the integrated industry profit). Since the seller can choose κi arbitrarily small, we
conclude that in all equilibria of this game, he must obtain Π∗.
Theorem 3 The game in which the seller announces referral fees has a unique equilibrium
outcome where the intermediaries specialize in agency and earn zero profits, and the ex-ante
expected equilibrium payoff of the seller is the integrated-industry profit Π∗.
Proof See Appendix A.
Suppose that we would allow seller to choose any mechanism at the beginning of the
game. It’s clear that the best outcome he can achieve is the integrated industry profit. One
contribution of Theorem 3 is, then, to show that the seller can obtain the same outcome with
a simple and natural game in which the seller offers per-buyer referral fees, and in which
intermediaries can choose to be either agents (refer) or merchants (buy and resell).
While referrals maximize industry profits, when the scheme is organized by the seller,
it leaves intermediaries with a zero payoff. However, when intermediaries operate as mer-
chants, they expect an information rent. Hence, when the seller has the bargaining power to
introduce referral fees, there is a conflict of interest among intermediaries and the seller with
regard to the introduction of such schemes. In fact, in these cases, intermediaries would gain
by being able to commit ex-ante to not referring their buyers. We show in the next section
that intermediaries may also profit from referrals when they have the bargaining power to
set up the scheme.
15
5.2 Bargaining power to intermediaries
We now consider the scenario in which intermediaries propose referral fees to the seller. The
timing of the game is as follows. First, intermediaries simultaneously announce per-buyer
referral fees to the seller. Let {κi}i∈I be the profile of proposed referral fees. Then, the seller
decides which referral fees to accept and which to reject. Intermediaries and buyers may or
may not observe the fees posted by other intermediaries (and their acceptance), but who
observes what is common knowledge and an intermediary observes more than his buyers. If
the seller rejects all referral fees, the game moves directly to the trade phase, as described
in Section 3. If at least one referral fee is accepted, the game moves to the referral phase,
and intermediaries whose referral fee is accepted can refer their buyers. After referrals take
place, the game moves to the trade phase, as described in Section 3.
We first observe that, in every equilibrium where the seller accepts referral fee κi > 0, it
must be the case that intermediary i refers all his buyers to the seller, regardless of his type
(Theorem 1 holds). Our second observation is that, in line with the analysis in Section 4,
once intermediary i refers all his buyers, the seller is able to extract all of his information at
no cost. In light of this, we can now show that, when intermediaries propose referral fees,
there is a class of equilibria in which all buyers are referred (i.e., intermediaries specialize
in agency); the joint profit of seller and intermediaries is the integrated-industry profit; and
intermediaries can extract part of this profit.
Let Π indicate the expected payoff of the seller in the trading phase when she is connected
only to intermediaries and has no additional information. For any subset of intermediaries
Iˆ ⊆ I, let Π∗
−Iˆ
indicate the payoff that the seller anticipates, when he expects to be connected
to all buyers of intermediaries in I \ {Iˆ} and to know their information, but he is neither
connected to nor has access to the information of intermediaries in Iˆ. Note that Π∗−∅ = Π
∗
and Π∗−I = Π. In words, Π
∗−Π∗
−Iˆ
is the marginal value to the seller from being connected in
the trading stage to the buyers of intermediaries in Iˆ and obtaining all available information
from them.
Theorem 4 In the game where intermediaries propose referral fees, for any profile of referral






κ∗iE[|Bi|], for all Iˆ ⊆ I, (3)
there is an equilibrium in which each type of intermediary i ∈ I proposes κ∗i , and the seller
accepts the proposal and the intermediaries specialize in agency. In this equilibrium, the ex-
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iE[|Bi|], and the ex-ante expected
equilibrium payoff of intermediary i is κ∗iE[|Bi|].
Proof See Appendix A.
Every equilibrium in this class is sustained by the seller’s belief that any deviation to
proposing a higher fee must come from the type of intermediary having the highest resale
value.14 Given this, intermediaries never want to propose a different referral fee. The seller
accepts all proposals because condition 3 guarantees that refusing any subset of them would
result in a lower payoff.15
In the class of equilibria of Theorem 4, an upper bound of the referral fee that the




, since condition (3) must also hold when Iˆ = {i}. Hence,
an upper bound of the equilibrium payoff of intermediary i is Π∗−Π∗−i, which is the marginal
contribution of intermediary i to the integrated industry profit. It then follows that as the
number of intermediaries grows larger, the maximum fee that each intermediary can ask
converges to zero.
When intermediaries propose the referral fees, there also exist equilibria in which in-
termediaries do not specialize in agency. For example, consider an equilibrium in which
intermediary i, regardless of his type, demands a referral fee above his expected per-buyer




, and the seller, whenever he observes a referral fee different
from κ∗i , believes that the intermediary has the highest possible resale value. In this equi-
librium, the seller refuses every proposal, including κ∗i , and intermediaries act as merchants.
Moreover, in an online appendix (Appendix C), we present an equilibrium in the same en-
vironment of Section 2, under which referral occurs with positive probability, but not with
probability one, and so the two business models co-exist. In every equilibrium in which refer-
ral does not occur with probability one, the aggregate payoff of the seller and intermediaries
is lower than Π∗, and the seller’s payoff is always at least Π (as the seller can always ensure
this payoff by rejecting all fees). When there is only one intermediary, this implies that
for each of these equilibria, there is an equilibrium in which the intermediary specializes in
agency (defined in Theorem 4) that results in a Pareto improvement.
14These out-of-equilibrium beliefs are natural, as the intermediaries with the highest resale value are the
ones who obtain the highest payoffs in the trading phase. For these reasons, the class of equilibria defined
in Theorem 4 survives to standard equilibrium refinements, such as intuitive criterion and the like.
15The condition in (3) is always satisfied for κ∗
i
= 0 for all i ∈ I, and so there is always an equilibrium in
this class.
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6 Policy implications and welfare effects
Our analysis shows that referrals generate an outcome that is equivalent to one that might
be obtained through an explicit vertical agreement (e.g., royalty contracts or vertical inte-
gration). For instance, under both vertical integration and an appropriately designed royalty
contract, the aggregate profit of the seller and the intermediary is the integrated industry
profit Π∗. Incidentally, this raises the question of why the agency model is so widely used,
instead of, say, royalty contracts. One obvious answer is that royalty contracts become
very complicated in the presence of multiple intermediaries, whereas referral schemes work
independently of the number of intermediaries.16
That, in trading environments, the option of referring at a positive fee and vertical
agreements may have similar effects on market outcomes is of interest to policy makers and
competition authorities, who are often concerned that vertical contracts may restrict com-
petition and decrease aggregate welfare. The discussion that follows shows that, much like
the classic vertical agreements that solve double marginalization in the single intermediary
case, referrals are likely to have positive effects on aggregate welfare. The welfare analysis
we perform compares the (ex-ante expected) aggregate welfare in the equilibrium outcome
of our game to the equilibrium outcome when referrals are not possible.
If there is only one intermediary, then referrals bring, unambiguously, an increase in the
aggregate welfare relative to a ban on referrals: With referrals, in equilibrium, the seller
deals with the same buyers and with the same information that the intermediary would deal
with after having acquired the object from the seller in a pure merchant model. So, the
welfare generated in the trading phase is the same in the two situations. However, in a pure
merchant model, the asymmetric information between the seller and the intermediary implies
that, with some probability, the object will not reach the intermediary, thereby creating a
potential loss in aggregate welfare.
When there are multiple intermediaries a new complication arises. Under the merchant
model only one intermediary will obtain the object, implying that many buyers do not even
have the chance to participate in the resale. Referrals eliminate this source of inefficiency but
may introduce a different one. In particular, when the seller aggregates a set of asymmetric
buyers coming from different intermediaries, he will distort the outcome away from the
efficient allocation in an attempt to maximize revenues.
16Since intermediaries access a different subset of buyers, in order to achieve the integrated industry profit,
a vertical restraint agreement would require a complicated system in which intermediaries bid after having
sold the option to buy to buyers, or variants of this.
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Nevertheless, there are some natural cases where we can conclude that the agency model
is unambiguously more efficient than the merchant model, given that the seller will generate
no extra distortions. One such case is when each intermediary has private information about
the number of connected buyers, but intermediaries and the seller have the same information
about buyers’ valuations, which are independently and identically distributed across buyers.
This may be a good approximation of industries in which the main asset of intermediaries
is the large set of potential customers.
Another case is the following.17 Suppose that all consumers’ valuations are drawn from
the same distribution. However, while the distribution is not perfectly known to the seller,
this information (i.e., the correct demand function) may be available to intermediaries. Such
information asymmetries between seller and intermediaries are descriptive of the online travel
industry, in which it is reasonable to assume that large intermediaries like Expedia and
Bookings.com have more precise information on consumers’ trends than small and localized
hoteliers have.
The welfare superiority of the agency model is not limited to environments in which the
seller is ultimately connected to buyers with the same expected demand. Coming to an
environment with asymmetric buyers, referrals increase efficiency if there are a number of
different consumer types (i.e., different distributions of valuations), and all the intermediaries
are connected to sets of buyers that contain all the different consumer types. Under this
scenario, the optimal mechanism that the seller uses in the trading phase–in which all buyers
participate–cannot introduce distortions in addition to those that each intermediary would
introduce in the resale phase anyway.
Finally, we note that referrals also unambiguously increase efficiency vis-a`-vis intermedia-
tion when all buyers are ex-ante identical, and the seller cannot use the intermediaries’ infor-
mation in designing the selling procedure due to legal reasons or reputation concerns. There
is, indeed, a large debate over confidentiality policies adopted by Facebook, Google, and
other social networking websites. In addition, Amazon’s past attempts to price-discriminate
based on buyers’ purchase history led to users’ outrage.18
Beyond these scenarios, a derivation of a general result in the context of the model that
we are using is problematic. In an online appendix (Appendix D), we develop a natural and
tractable example in which such distortions are present, and we show that referrals are still,





We now investigate a number of environments in which Theorem 1 fails. We show that
the failure of the unraveling result leads to the emergence of equilibria in which referrals
and intermediated trade co-exist. Often, this implies that the aggregate payoff of seller and
intermediaries is below the integrated industry profit.
The unifying motive underlying the co-existence of the two business models of interme-
diation is the failure of Lemma 1. When extra frictions are assumed, an intermediary may
sometimes expect a positive profit by not referring buyers who generate high profits from
resale. When these profits exceed the referral payments, in equilibrium, intermediaries do
not specialize in agency. We develop these intuitions using simple examples.
7.1 Non-specialized intermediaries
In our model, intermediaries have no private value for consuming the object. They are
specialized in intermediation. We now consider intermediaries who have a private value for
consuming the object–non-specialized intermediaries. We show in the context of a simple
example that for low referral fees, intermediaries do not specialize in referrals. As a con-
sequence, intermediated trade and referrals coexist, and intermediaries may make positive
profits.
We assume that there is one intermediary who has no buyer with probability q ∈ (0, 1) and
has one buyer with the remaining probability.20 The buyer has valuation vH , which is known
to both the intermediary and the seller. In addition, we assume that the intermediary has
a known consumption value vI and vH > vI > (1− q)vH . The latter assumption guarantees
that, in the case where trade can be only intermediated, the seller prefers to ask vI of the
intermediary.
Proposition 1 (i) If κ ∈ [0, vH − vI), then, in equilibrium, the intermediary never refers
the buyer. (ii) In every equilibrium of the game in which the seller announces referral fees,
the seller obtains payoff vI and the intermediary with the buyer obtains vH − vI .
19In the example, the seller faces two intermediaries with one buyer each. The valuations of the buyers
are uniformly distributed in [0, t1] and [0, t2]; the intermediaries know t1 and t2, but the seller does not know
them.
20The assumption that the seller is uncertain about which buyers are connected to the intermediary is
crucial for the unraveling result to fail in this example.
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Proof See Appendix A.
When κ < vH − vI , in every equilibrium the intermediary never refers his buyer. If the
intermediary were to refer the buyer with positive probability, upon observing non-referral,
the seller would believe that the intermediary has no buyer with a probability which is at
least q and, therefore, would optimally posts a price vI . But then, when the intermediary
has a buyer, he strictly prefers to hold the buyer, buying at a price vI and then reselling at
vH , instead of referring the buyer and getting κ. The second part of the proposition shows
that, since the seller cannot get access to all buyers at arbitrarily low costs, the intermediary
obtains positive profits even if the seller has full bargaining power in announcing referral fees.
Finally, we note that in this example, the aggregate profit of seller and intermediary is the
integrated industry profit. However, it is easy to construct more-complex examples where
the failure of the unraveling result prevents the seller and the intermediary from maximizing
industry profits.
7.2 Posted price
We have allowed the seller to choose any incentive-compatible direct mechanism in which
neither buyers nor intermediaries can be forced to participate. We now consider the simpler
and common selling procedure of posting a price. We show that the unraveling result may
fail–that, in equilibrium, referrals and intermediated trade can coexist and that the aggregate
payoff of the seller and the intermediaries can be below the integrated industry profit.
We analyze the case where, in the trading stage, the seller asks the information of inter-
mediaries who have referred buyers and then commits to post a single price that is optimal,
given the information provided. The seller incentivizes intermediaries to tell the truth by
offering them a commission equal to a fraction α of the final revenue. Once the price is
posted, all intermediaries and buyers can buy at that price. If more than one agent wishes
to purchase, each agent obtains the object with equal probability.
We use the following simple example. With probability q, the intermediary has only one
buyer with value 0 < vL < 1 (type A). With probability 1 − q, he also has a second buyer
with value vH = 1 (type B). We assume that the intermediary knows the value of the buyers
and that vL < 1− q. The latter assumption implies that, absent the possibility of referrals,
the seller will post price vH = 1.
Proposition 2 (i) If κ ∈ [0, (1− vL)/2), there is no equilibrium in which the intermediary
always refers all buyers. (ii) In every equilibrium of the game in which the seller announces
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referral fees, the seller announces κ∗ = 0; there is a strictly positive probability that the high-
value buyer is not referred; and the seller charges price vH regardless of who is referred. In
equilibrium, the seller obtains a payoff of (1− q)vH and the intermediary obtains a payoff of
zero. The equilibrium outcome is analogous to the one obtained if referrals are not allowed.
Proof See Appendix A.
When the referral fee is positive but not too high, an equilibrium with full referral is not
viable. Indeed, if the intermediary always refers his buyers, whenever the intermediary refers
only one buyer, the seller will post a price vL. But this implies that when the intermediary
has two buyers, he will prefer to refer only the low-value buyer and obtain a high profit
from buying and reselling to the high-value buyer. The second part of the proposition shows
that the impossibility of obtaining full referral with arbitrarily low referral fees implies that,
in equilibrium, the intermediary always refers low-value buyers while retaining high-value
buyers with positive probability. Hence, the intermediary acts both as a referral agent and
as a merchant.
7.3 Budget-Constrained Intermediaries
In this section, we consider a scenario in which intermediaries are budget-constrained and
have limited access to financial markets. We show that if intermediaries are budget-constrained,
the unraveling result fails, and referral and intermediated trade often co-exist.
We slightly modify the example developed in Section 2. As in that example, we assume
that there is only one intermediary connected to one buyer. The valuation of the buyer
is vB ∈ {vL, vH}, with vL < vH ; the seller believes that vB = vH with probability f > 0,
and the intermediary knows vB. In addition, we now assume that the intermediary has an
amount of cash C < vH , which is known to the seller.
It is clear in this case that the seller cannot get the buyer always referred with an
arbitrary small referral fee. Because the maximum price that the seller can charge is C, the
intermediary with a high-value buyer will never be willing to refer the buyer for a referral fee
κ < vH − C. Again, the unraveling result of Theorem 1 fails. The next Proposition shows
the consequence of this failure in the case where the seller announces a referral fee.
Proposition 3 Consider the game in which the seller announces a referral fee.
1. Suppose that C < vL. In equilibrium, the seller announces κ
∗ = 0, each intermediary’s
type chooses not to refer the buyer, and conditional on non-referral, the seller asks
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a price C of the intermediary.21 Hence, the seller gets C, the intermediary with a
high-value buyer gets vH −C and the intermediary with a low-value buyer gets vL−C.
2. Suppose that vL < C < vH . In equilibrium, the seller announces κ
∗ = 0, the interme-
diary with a low-value buyer always refers, the intermediary with a high-value buyer
never refers, and, conditional on non-referral, the seller asks a price C of the interme-
diary. Hence, the seller gets (1− f)vL + fC, the intermediary with a low-value buyer
gets zero and the intermediary with a high-value buyer gets vH − C.
Proof See Appendix A.
When both types are budget-constrained, referrals do not help the seller. To get the
low-value buyer referred, he must offer at least vL − C. Therefore, the seller is better off
without using referrals.
When only the intermediary with a high-value buyer is budget-constrained things are
a bit more subtle. First, for any positive referral fee, the intermediary always refers the
low-value buyer because the price charged by the seller will never be below vL. This implies
that upon non-referral, the seller knows that the intermediary has the high-value buyer and
can safely charge C. Given that the seller can guarantee himself a payoff arbitrarily close
to (1− f)vL + fC by setting an arbitrarily small referral fee, in the only equilibrium of the
game she sets κ = 0, and the intermediary refers only the low-value buyer.22
We conclude with a remark on the effect of competition among intermediaries. Suppose
that there are two intermediaries, each connected to a buyer that has either valuation vL or
valuation vH , with budgets C1 < C2 < vL. The seller knows that he can get at least C2 by
selling to intermediary 2 or to his buyer. In light of this, intermediary 1 knows that he will
make zero profits if he trades directly with the seller. Hence, intermediary 1 strictly prefers
to refer his buyer for any arbitrarily low referral fee, regardless of the valuation of his buyer.
Then, since the seller gets access to intermediary 1’s buyer, he can generate at least vL by
dealing with that buyer. Therefore, the payoff of intermediary 2, if he does not refer, is zero.
21There is another equilibrium in which the seller announces κ∗ = vL − C, the intermediary with a low-
value buyer randomizes between referring or not, and the intermediary with a high-value buyer never refers.
This equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to the one described in the Proposition.
22These results generalize to the case of a continuum of valuations, vB ∈ [vL, vH ] as follows. If C < vL, for
a given referral fee κ, let v¯ be the highest-valuation intermediary who refers the buyer–i.e., v¯−C = κ. Types
above, strictly prefer to buy the good at C and resell it rather than receive the referral fee κ. The expected
revenue the seller can extract from the referred buyers is strictly less than v¯, so an upper bound (that is not
reached) for his per-intermediary type payoff is v¯−κ, which is exactly equal to C–the per-intermediary type
payoff without referral. Hence, the seller is strictly better off by just selling the good to the intermediary at
a price of C. It is easy to extend the argument for the case of vL < C < vH .
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To conclude, the unraveling result is resurrected: In every equilibrium of this example where
κ > 0, intermediaries always refer their buyer.
8 Conclusion
We have maintained that the seller has all the bargaining power to determine the terms
of selling the good to the intermediaries. However, if intermediaries have the power to set
the terms of purchase from the seller, things change. If there is only one intermediary, we
conjecture that all intermediary’s types will ask the same price, equal to seller’s marginal
cost, so there are no referrals. If there are multiple intermediaries, then competition among
them for the good will dissipate rents, so we would expect referrals to co-exist with the
merchant model. The full analysis of this case is interesting but is left for future work.
Another interesting direction for future work is to investigate the role of referrals and
intermediated trade in a model in which there is competition among sellers. Preliminary
investigation suggests that there are additional forces at play in such an environment–such
as competition among multiple principals–which raises new issues that are beyond the scope
of the present paper.
To conclude, we stress that Theorem 1 applies more generally to environments in which a
third party mediates the relationship between the principal and the agent(s). For example,
consider the following adverse-selection problem: A principal wants to hire a specialized
agent to perform a given task. The outcome of the task is observable and determines the
payoff of the principal. The agent may be more or less skilled, and his skill level determines
the quality of his work. Suppose that the principal has no access to the agent, but is in
contact with a job agency. The agency, in addition to having contact with the agent, is
also better informed about his skills. In principle, the agency can either contract with the
principal and then subcontract the work to the agent, or it can refer the agent to the principal
in exchange for a fee. In this context (assuming that the principal makes a contract proposal
to the agency in the former case), Theorem 1 predicts that any positive referral fee offered
by the seller will cause the job agency to pass the agent to the principal.
More broadly, referrals play an important role in many markets and their role is bound
to become more prominent with the proliferation of social media. We hope and expect this
work to inspire new research on the effects of referrals on market outcomes.
24
Appendix A: Proofs not included in the main text
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose, for a contradiction, that there is an incentive-compatible















= ui > 0. (4)
Since all other types ti ∈ T
∗
i (Bˆi) can mimic ti(Bˆi) and have higher resale values, incentive
compatibility implies that:










≥ ui for all ti ∈ T
∗
i (Bˆi).
Next, observe that in the proposed incentive-compatible mechanism, all types with zero
resale value must have the same utility, say u˜i, and 0 ≤ u˜i ≤ ui; otherwise, the mechanism
would not be incentive-compatible. Observe, also, that since these types have zero resale
value, they must obtain a transfer that is exactly equal to u˜i.
Now, consider the following modification of the above mechanism. First, assign the object
with zero probability to all types of i with zero resale value and set their payment to zero.
Second, increase the interim payment of all types ti ∈ T
∗
i (Bˆi) by ui. Clearly, if this new
mechanism is incentive-compatible and satisfies participation constraints, it attains a strictly
higher revenue for the seller, contradicting our initial hypothesis.
To see that the new mechanism is incentive-compatible start by noting that only the
incentives of intermediary i have been affected. Next, observe that types with zero resale
value are willing to participate and do not have a strict incentive to deviate to reporting other
types with zero resale value or types with positive resale value. To see the latter, observe that
the payment required from all types with positive resale value is strictly positive. Finally,
consider the types with positive resale value. First, they are still willing to participate, as
the lowest type among them is willing to do so. Second, they are not willing to deviate
to types with zero resale value as these types never get the object and do not receive any
positive transfer. Third, they are not willing to deviate to other types with positive resale
value, as the mechanism was originally incentive-compatible and all the payments made by
the positive resale types have been reduced by the same amount.
Proof of Theorem 2 To prove the existence of an equilibrium with the desired property,
consider the following strategy profile. Intermediaries always refer all their buyers. The seller
uses a revenue-maximizing direct mechanism given his posterior beliefs. In particular, along
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the equilibrium path, the seller’s optimal mechanism never assigns the good to intermediaries
or pays them anything, but uses the truthful reports of intermediaries to sell optimally to
the buyers. Intermediaries and referred buyers report their types truthfully. Whenever in-
termediary i ∈ I acquires the object, he commits to a revenue-maximizing direct mechanism
given his posterior beliefs.
It is immediate to verify that this strategy profile generates an (ex-ante) expected payoff
of Π∗ −
∑
i∈I E[|Bi|]κ for the seller and of E[|Bi|]κ for the intermediary. We now establish
that this strategy profile is an equilibrium. The seller’s strategy is, by definition, optimal.
Instead, consider intermediary i ∈ I. At the trading phase, when intermediary i has ac-
quired the object, he employs a revenue-maximizing mechanism given his posterior beliefs,
so deviating cannot increase his revenue. At the referral stage, if intermediary i deviates
from his equilibrium strategy and does not refer all his buyers, there are two possibilities
to consider. The first possibility is that the seller observes the deviation. In this case, we
assign the seller the out-of-equilibrium belief that the intermediary has the highest resale
value. Under these beliefs, in the optimal mechanism, the intermediary clearly gets a payoff
of 0. Hence, this is not a profitable deviation. If the seller does not observe the deviation,
then he will believe that intermediary i has referred all the buyers, so the mechanism that he
employs at the trading phase never allocates the good to i and pays nothing to i, implying
that intermediary i obtains a payoff of zero in the trading phase. Again, this deviation is not
strictly profitable. So, it is a best reply for each intermediary to refer all his buyers. Finally,
whenever buyers and intermediaries are asked to report their type, being truthful is a best
reply since the mechanism is, by design, incentive-compatible.
We now show the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs. We have already established, in
Theorem 1, that in any equilibrium, all buyers are always referred. We have also pointed out
a strategy of the seller that, in this case, guarantees the seller the maximum payoff that he
can achieve, Π∗−
∑
i∈I E[|Bi|]κ. Noting that the seller will never use a suboptimal strategy
concludes the proof.23
Proof of Theorem 3 Since Theorems 1 and 2 apply when κi > 0 for all i ∈ I, we know
23It is evident that when the seller uses the mechanism outlined above, intermediaries do not have a
strict incentive to report truthfully, and, therefore, there are multiple equilibria. However, from a formal
perspective, we are taking a mechanism design approach and we are maintaining that the equilibrium selected
by the seller will ensue. From a more substantial perspective, there is no equilibrium where the intermediaries
fail to report valuable information to the seller. In fact, the seller can use a mechanism identical to the one
above, but that uses strictly positive, but arbitrarily small, commission fees for intermediaries (i.e., offers a
percentage of the final revenue), thus making truthful reporting of valuable information by the intermediaries
a dominant strategy.
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that the seller can always guarantee himself a payoff arbitrarily close to Π∗ by setting κi > 0
for all i ∈ I arbitrarily small. Therefore, there is no equilibrium where the seller chooses the
referral fees and obtains a payoff strictly less than Π∗.
To complete the proof, we need to show that there is, indeed, an equilibrium in which
the seller sets κi = 0 for all i ∈ I and all intermediaries refer all buyers. To see that such an
equilibrium exists, it is sufficient to refer to the same equilibrium strategy outlined in the
proof of Theorem 2, complemented by the initial choice of κi = 0 for all i ∈ I by the seller.
All the arguments of the existence part of the proof of Theorem 2 also apply when κi = 0
for all i ∈ I, and, therefore, it is only necessary to show that setting κi = 0 for all i ∈ I is a
best reply for the seller, which is obvious.
Proof of Theorem 4 For any κ∗ that satisfies the conditions in the statement of the
Theorem, consider the following strategy profile: For each i ∈ I, each intermediary type
ti ∈ Ti proposes κ
∗
i . The seller accepts κi ≤ κ
∗
i , and rejects every proposal κi > κ
∗
i , for
all i ∈ I. When the seller observes a proposal κi ≤ κ
∗
i , his beliefs about intermediary
i’s type remains equal to his prior. When the seller observes κi > κ
∗
i , he believes that
intermediary i is of the highest resale value type. When the seller accepts a referral fee
κi ≥ 0, the intermediary i refers all his buyers. In the trading phase, the seller sets an
optimal mechanism as described in the proof of Theorem 3. We show that this profile of
strategies is an equilibrium.
If the intermediary ti ∈ Ti proposes κ
∗
i , he obtains |Bi|κ
∗
i . By proposing κi < κ
∗
i , he
obtains |Bi|κi < |Bi|κ
∗
i . If he proposes κi > κ
∗
i , the seller rejects the proposal and asks
a price that equals the highest resale value of the intermediary. Hence, the intermediary
obtains a payoff of zero regardless of whether or not he gets the object at the trading phase.
Next, consider the seller. It is clear that it is optimal to reject κ > κ∗ given that her
posterior belief in that case is that the intermediary is of the highest resale value type. The
condition in equation (3) guarantees that the seller is not willing to deviate and reject any
set of proposals, when the proposed profile is lower (component-wise) than or equal to κ∗.




iE[|Bi|], while by rejecting
any subset of offers by Iˆ, the amount he saves in the referral stage is below the loss in payoff
in the trading phase.
Proof of Proposition 1 When κ < vH−vI , there is no equilibrium in which the buyer is
referred with some probability because, given this strategy, upon observing non-referral, the
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seller will ask price vI of the intermediary. Hence, when κ < vH−vI is part of an equilibrium,
the seller obtains vI . Since the seller can always guarantee himself vI by setting κ = 0, there
is no equilibrium in which κ > vH − vI . When κ = vH − vI , the intermediary is indifferent
between referring or not (the seller asks vI of the intermediary when there is no referral,
regardless of the intermediary’s strategy). However, because the seller can guarantee himself
vI , there is no equilibrium of the game in which κ = vH − vI , and the intermediary does not
refer the buyer. In light of these considerations, there is a class of equilibria where the seller
proposes κ < vH − vI and an equilibrium in which he proposes κ = vH − vI and there is full
referral.
Proof of Proposition 2 There are two possible types of one intermediary. With prob-
ability q, the intermediary has only one buyer with value 0 < vL < 1 (type A). With
probability 1 − q, he also has a second buyer with value 1 (type B). We assume that the
intermediary knows the value of the buyer and that vL < 1 − q. The latter assumption
implies that, absent the possibility of referrals the seller would post price 1.
First, note that when κ ≥ (1 − vL)/2, both types find it weakly optimal to refer all
their buyers. In fact, (1 − vL)/2 is the maximum continuation payoff that type B can get.
However, it is clear that setting κ ≥ (1 − vL)/2 is suboptimal for the seller. His expected
continuation payoff becomes q(vL − (1− vL)/2) + (1− q)(1− (1− vL)) = vL − q(1− vL)/2,
which is below the payoff from just asking price 1 with no referrals, which is (1− q).
Therefore, the focus on sub-games starting after (1 − vL)/2 > κ > 0 has been posted.
Type A always refer the low-valuation buyer, as no price below vL is ever charged. Given
this, type B must also always refer the low-valuation buyer, as otherwise he would identify
himself. Let σ be the probability that type B also refers the high-valuation buyer. Let q̂ be
the posterior probability held by the seller that the intermediary is A, given that only the
low type has been referred. By Bayes’ rule:
q̂(σ) =
q
q + (1− q)(1− σ)
.
Upon observing referral of the low type, the seller posts price 1 when vL < 1 − q̂ and
price vL when vL > 1 − q̂ . The seller is indifferent between the two prices if q̂ = 1 − vL.
Observe that q̂ takes value in [q, 1] and is monotonically increasing in σ. Then, let σ˜ be the
one that makes the seller indifferent, which is such that q̂(σ˜) = 1− vL. We have
σ˜ =




We can see immediately that there is no equilibrium with σ < σ˜ because the seller would
ask price 1 and type B would be better off with σ = 1. We can also see that it is impossible
that σ > σ˜, as the seller would set price vL, and, therefore, intermediary B would be better
off with σ = 0.
To sustain an equilibrium when type B plays σ˜, we need the seller to make type B
indifferent between accepting the referral fee and not referring the buyer. When type B does
not refer the buyer, he obtains the object with probability 1 if the seller posts price vH and,
given the competition from the low-value buyer, with probability 1/2 when the seller posts





Hence, in the unique equilibrium of the continuation game starting with κ > 0, interme-
diary’s types A and B always refer the low-value buyer, while B refers the high-value buyer
with probability σ˜. The seller posts price vH if he observes that the high-value buyer has
been referred, while he randomizes between the two prices with probability y when observing
that only the low-value buyer has been referred.
In light of the above, the seller’s profit for any κ > 0 is
(1− q)σ˜(1− 2κ) + (1− q)(1− σ˜)[yvL + (1− y)− κ] + q(yvL − κ),
Next, recall that q < 1 − vL, and, therefore, the above expression is decreasing in κ. It
follows that there is no equilibrium in which κ > 0. By taking the limit when κ → 0, we
can see that there is one equilibrium in which κ = 0, the seller always posts price 1 and the
intermediary B randomizes according to σ˜. The seller obtains 1 − q and the intermediary
zero, which is the payoff profile we would observe in the absence of referral.
Are there other equilibria when κ = 0? Yes, but in all those equilibria, the seller must
always be (generically) setting a price of 1 in all cases. Suppose, in fact, that the seller sets
price vL whenever either (i) no buyer is referred or (ii) when the low buyer only is referred.
Then, the intermediary of type B would always procure the object at price vL by referring
either no buyer or the low-value buyer. But this is not possible, as whenever this happens,
the posteriors would be such that the seller would prefer to set vH = 1. Hence, in any other
equilibrium, the payoff of the seller is always 1− q and the payoff of the intermediary is zero.
Because the payoff of both types of intermediaries is always zero when the seller sets price
1, we conclude that any referral strategy that guarantees posteriors such that in all states
1, is asked in part of an equilibrium in which κ = 0. For example, there is one equilibrium
29
where no type ever refers. If we maintain that A refers his buyer with probability 1, the only
other equilibria are such that B refers with any probability [0, σ̂] and the seller posts price
1 with probability one.
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose that C < vL. First, note that when the seller observes
no referral, he will charge the intermediary a price pI = C, regardless of his beliefs about
the intermediary’s type. Hence, by non-referring, the intermediary with buyer vB obtains
a payoff vB − C, regardless of the strategy of the other intermediary’s type. We then have
that if κ ∈ [0, vB − C], the intermediary with buyer vB prefers not to refer, and this holds
strictly for κ ∈ [0, vB − C). When κ > vB − C, the intermediary with buyer vB strictly
prefers to refer the buyer. It is immediate to check that the best referral fee that the seller
can announce is κ∗ ∈ {0, vL − C}.
Suppose that vL < C < vH . First, note that in every equilibrium in which the seller
announces κ > 0, the intermediary with a low-value buyer must refer with probability one.
This follows because upon non-referral, the seller will always ask a price pI ≥ vL. This implies
that, in every equilibrium following κ > 0, when the seller observes that the intermediary
has not referred his buyer, he believes that the intermediary has a high-value buyer and,
therefore, asks the intermediary a price pI = C. Consequently, the intermediary with a
high-value buyer prefers not to refer when κ ∈ (0, vH − C], and his preferences are strict
when κ < vH − C. When κ > vH − C, the intermediary with a high-value buyer also refers
with probability one. When κ = 0, the intermediary with a low-value buyer is indifferent
between referring or not, whereas the intermediary with a high-value buyer strictly prefers
not to refer. Taking these continuation equilibria, it is immediate to show that in the only
equilibrium of the game, the seller sets κ = 0, the intermediary with a low-value buyer must
refer with probability one, and the intermediary with a high-value buyer never refers.
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Appendix B to “Selling Through Referrals”: Referrals with
Communication
Daniele Condorelli, Andrea Galeotti and Vasiliki Skreta
April 30, 2013
In this Appendix, we explore a variation of the model examined in the main paper. In this
variation, intermediaries communicate with the seller during the referral stage. We model com-
munication as cheap talk. We assume that once an intermediary has referred all his buyers, such
intermediary has no more interactions with the seller. If this were not the case, then this cheap talk
stage would be irrelevant as the seller would be able to extract intermediaries’ information in the
trading stage, as in the benchmark model. Overall, we see that the results of the main paper are
essentially unchanged. The only difference is that when communication happens simultaneously
with referrals, we get multiple equilibria. This is primarily because we look at very simple (but
realistic) referral contracts, and communication is cheap talk.
1 Model revisited
The model is identical to the one analyzed in the paper, with the difference that now intermediaries
report information about their buyers at the referral stage:
Referral Stage. Intermediaries simultaneously decide on the set of buyers to refer to the seller
and on an unverifiable message to send to the seller. Intermediary i can only refer buyers in Bi. A
strategy of intermediary i is denoted by σi, σ denotes a strategy profile and σ−i a strategy profile
of all intermediaries except intermediary i.
The seller observes all referred buyers and pays intermediaries according to the announced
referral schedule. Since intermediaries have no consumption value, if they refer all their buyers,
they leave once they have collected the referral fee.
Each intermediary may or may not observe the referral and the messages of the other interme-
diaries. Each buyer may or may not observe the referral and the messages of the intermediaries.
As we shall see, we can allow for different possibilities.
Trade Stage. The seller updates his beliefs about the buyers’ valuations and the intermediaries’
information based on what happened during the referral state. Given these updated beliefs, the
seller chooses an optimal mechanism to sell the object to the referred buyers and to the interme-
diaries that are still present in the market. The participants may or may not observe the outcome
of the mechanism. If a buyer acquires the object, the game ends. If an intermediary acquires the
object, then the intermediary chooses an optimal mechanism to sell the object to his non-referred
buyers.
We look for perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game.
1
2 Equilibrium payoffs
Given Theorem 1 established in the main paper, the lower bound of the seller’s payoff, denoted by
Π, is the expected revenue of an optimal mechanism when all buyers are referred uninformatively.
The best-case scenario for the seller is an equilibrium in which all buyers are referred, the truth
is reported, and referral payments are zero. Denote by Π∗(t) the expected revenue of an optimal
mechanism in the case where the seller accesses every buyer and the intermediaries have truthfully
reported information t.1 Then, the maximum equilibrium payoff that the seller can extract in this
environment, denoted by Π∗, is the expected value of Π∗(t), where the expectation is with respect
t ∈ T .
The difference ∆ = Π∗ − Π is the maximum value of all the intermediaries’ information. We
now investigate how different referral fees affect the information that intermediaries will be induced
to reveal in equilibrium. We examine whether it is possible to induce truthful communication and,
if yes how the pie Π∗ is split among the seller and the intermediaries. In what follows, we assume
that, indeed, all the intermediaries as a group have access to relevant information for the seller, so
that ∆ > 0. We start by analyzing equilibria in which the seller offers a flat fee per referred buyer.
2.1 Seller proposes: Non-contingent referral fees
A non-contingent referral schedule defines a positive payment to each intermediary for each referred
buyer. Formally, a non-contingent referral schedule is κ = {κ1, . . . , κI}, where κi is the referral fee
that intermediary i gets for each buyer he refers to the seller.2
Equilibrium communication and payoffs
Theorem 1 implies that, under non-contingent referral fees, the equilibrium continuation payoff
of an intermediary after the referral stage is independent of the communication strategy he employs:
All buyers are referred and intermediary i’s payoff is equal to the number of his buyers times the
referral fee, regardless of the report that he makes to the seller. Therefore, under full referral,
equilibrium does not impose any restriction on the reporting strategy. This implies that for a
non-contingent referral schedule, there is an equilibrium in which all intermediaries babble and not
reveal any information, as well as a fully informative equilibrium where all intermediaries report
their information truthfully, regardless of its realization.
Proposition 1 There is a class of equilibria where all the buyers are referred and all the interme-
diaries report their information to the seller truthfully: In these equilibria, the sum of payoffs of
the intermediaries is K∗ ∈ [0,∆] and the seller’s payoff is Π∗ −K∗.
Proof. We first describe the strategy profile employed in the class of equilibria we are consider-
ing. For each i ∈ I, the seller announces κ∗
i
so that the expected referral payment to intermediary
i equals κ∗
i
ni, where ni is the expected number of buyers of intermediary i. Each intermediary
refers all his buyers, regardless of his type and regardless of the announced κ; if the per-consumer
referral fee is κi ≥ κ
∗
i
for all i ∈ I, then each intermediary communicates truthfully; otherwise,
1Note that Π∗(t) ≥ Π, because the seller can always guarantee the revenue he acquires with less information, by
designing a mechanism that disregards the additional information.
2Two remarks are in order. First, the payment is independent of the message that an intermediary sends to the
seller. Since messages are not verifiable, this restriction is without loss of generality: If the seller were to propose
a schedule that pays an intermediary a different fee for the same set of referred buyers but different messages, the
intermediary will send only messages that provide the highest fee. Second, we could have defined the non-contingent
referral schedule more generally: A non-contingent referral schedule maps the set of all referred buyers into a payment
to each intermediary. Formally, κ = {κ1, . . . , κI} where κi : P(B)
n → R+, where P(B) denotes the power set of
B = ∪i∈IBi. Our results are not affected by this restriction.
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each intermediary communicates uninformatively. The seller, intermediaries and buyers behave
optimally in the trade stage. When the seller observes a deviation in the referral stage, he assumes
that each deviator has the type with the highest resale value–i.e., if intermediary i deviates in the
referral stage, then the seller believes that intermediary i is of type t¯i.
We now show that the proposed strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. If the seller offers
a referral fee κ where κi < κ
∗
i
for some i ∈ I, the seller will get, at most, Π ≤ Π∗ −K∗, which is
the payoff to the seller if he announces κ∗ and where K∗ stands for the expected referral payments
given κ∗.
Theorem 1 implies that for intermediary i to refer all buyers when κi > 0 is a best reply; when
κi = 0, referring everyone is a best reply given the specified out-of-equilibrium belief of the seller.
Once an intermediary refers all buyers, he is indifferent between any communication strategies,
regardless of the seller’s conjecture about his communication strategy. Hence, revealing his type
when κi ≥ κ
∗
i
for all i ∈ I, and sending uninformative messages otherwise, is a best reply. We now
show that there is not an equilibrium where the payoff of the seller is lower than Π. Notice that,
in view of Theorem 1, by offering a referral fee of κi = ε to each intermediary i, the seller gets
all buyers referred. Under full referral, the worse equilibrium is when all intermediaries babble,
and this provides a gross payoff of Π and an expected referral cost that can be made negligible by
setting ε arbitrarily close to 0.
Proposition 1 pins down the set of total equilibrium payoffs of all market participants. Note
that the highest aggregate profits that intermediaries can attain in equilibrium is ∆ = Π∗ −Π–the
value of the additional information that intermediaries have about potential buyers, as compared
to the initial information that the seller has. We now provide a couple of remarks:
Remark 1 Suppose that intermediaries are fully informed about the type of their buyers–i.e., ti =
(si, Bi) and si specifies the valuation of each of the buyers j ∈ Bi. In this case, Π
∗ is simply the
expected total surplus, and every equilibrium in Proposition 1 is ex-post efficient.
We have assumed that each intermediary i observes κ = {κ1, .., κI}. In some contexts, it is
more natural to assume that intermediary i observes only the referral fee he is paid when he refers
his buyers, but not the referral fee of other intermediaries. Formally, for a given κ, intermediary i
observes κi, but does not observe κi′ , i
′ ∈ I \ {i}. We now illustrate the consequence of restricting
the observability of the referral schedule.
Remark 2 Consider that each intermediary i observes only κi. First, observe that Theorem 1 still
holds in this environment. Second, as in the case of full observability (see Proposition 1), there is
still a class of equilibria where all information is aggregated and, in each of these equilibria, the
aggregate payoffs of the seller and intermediaries is Π∗. It is also the case that Π and Π∗ are the
minimum and maximum equilibrium payoffs attainable by the seller, respectively.
However, in contrast to Proposition 1, we cannot guarantee that the sum of payoffs of the
intermediaries is K∗ ∈ [0,∆] and the seller’s payoff is Π∗ −K∗. The reason is that, now, a seller
can deviate with a subset of intermediaries by announcing a lower referral fee, and in that subgame,
only the intermediaries that have observed the deviation can react to it.
To summarize, in this section we have shown that with an extremely simple referral payment,
there are equilibria in which the seller induces the intermediaries to refer all their buyers and to
report their information truthfully. When intermediaries are perfectly informed about the buyers’
valuations, this leads to efficient trade. When intermediaries are imperfectly informed about buyers’
valuations, the asymmetries between the information of the intermediaries and the seller with regard
to the information of buyers’ valuations do not produce any distortion. We now examine what
happens when the seller offers a referral fee that is a fraction of the revenue the seller generates.
These referral contracts resemble commission fees that are often used in practice.
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2.2 Seller proposes: Contingent referral fees
We now show that if the seller can offer referral fees that are fractions of the revenue generated–that
is, commissions–then the seller can assure, at a minimum cost, not only that all the intermediaries
refer all their buyers, but also that they truthfully disclose all their information. With contingent
referral fees, the seller pays each intermediary i a percentage κi of his final revenue.
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Our first observation is that when κi > 0, Theorem 1 holds. Therefore, in any continuation
equilibrium starting in the referral stage with κi > 0, all buyers are referred to the seller.
4 We now
show that, for each κi ≥ 0, there exists a fully informative equilibrium
Proposition 2 With contingent referral fees, there is an equilibrium in which all intermediaries
refer all their buyers and report their information truthfully. The seller obtains all of the expected
total surplus Π∗, whereas intermediaries obtain no rents.
Proof. This equilibrium in sustained by the following strategy: The seller proposes a referral
schedule that rewards intermediary i a fraction κi of the generated revenue; all intermediaries refer
all their buyers and report their information truthfully. If there is non-referral by the intermediary,
the seller assigns probability 1 to this coming from the type of i with the highest resale value. All
players choose revenue-maximizing procedures in the trading phase, given their beliefs. We now
argue that this strategy is an equilibrium.
First, note that as long as κi > 0, the unraveling result holds. Moreover, the referral payment
is an increasing function of the seller’s revenue. Hence, if the seller and the intermediaries expect
all intermediaries to be truthful, then it is a best response for each intermediary i to report the
truth. To see this, note that, reporting the truth, intermediary i gets κiniΠ
∗(t) ≥ κiniΠ
′, where
Π′ is the optimal revenue given reports tˆi, t−i with tˆi 6= ti, when the true state is ti, t−i. Then, the
seller’s payoff is (1 − K)Π∗, where K = Σi∈Iκini, and the seller’s best response is to set each κi
arbitrarily low.
Unfortunately, there also exist uninformative equilibria. For example, if, after referrals take
place, the seller expects all the intermediaries to babble, then it is a best response for intermediary
i to babble, as his report does not affect the seller’s mechanism choice.5 Let κ be the referral
schedule employed at the babbling equilibrium; in equilibrium, this fee must be arbitrarily low
since the seller’s payoff is (1−K)Π, so K = 0. This equilibrium is strictly Pareto dominated by
the fully informative equilibrium since the intermediaries make zero in both cases, whereas for
the seller, (1−K)Π∗ > (1−K)Π, which follows from the fact that intermediaries have useful
information, implying that ∆ = Π∗ −Π > 0. Given that ∆ > 0, in addition to interim and ex-post
strict Pareto domination, the informative equilibrium is the only equilibrium that survives the
NITS (no-incentive-to-separate) criterion in Chen et al. (2008),6 the neologism proof criterion in
Farrell (1993), or the selection criterion in Matthews et al. (1991).
An equilibrium satisfies the NITS condition if the equilibrium payoff of the worst-type inter-
mediary is (weakly) higher than the payoff of that type had the seller known his information and
reacted optimally to it. We make two observations. First, in our game, we can define the worst
type as any intermediary type, so we just pick the type that strictly increases revenue by telling
3We don’t need to introduce more-elaborate contracts (e.g., contracts that pay an intermediary only if the good
is sold to one of the buyer referred by him) because, as we will see, focusing on this class is without loss of generality
in terms of what the seller can achieve.
4Since the seller’s revenue upon referral is always strictly greater than zero, κ > 0 implies that the expected
referral payment to the intermediary is strictly positive.
5There can also exist partially informative equilibria.
6In contrast to standard cheap-talk, where there is a conflict of interest among different types of the same sender
as to the level of informativeness of an equilibrium, in our case all types are weakly better off in the informative
equilibrium compared to any other equilibrium.
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the truth. Such a type exists because ∆ > 0; otherwise, we would have Π∗ = Π. Second, for the
case of non-contingent fees, the NITS criterion does not affect the equilibrium payoffs that we have
characterized in Proposition 1; indeed, the intermediaries’ payoffs are independent of the informa-
tion they provide to the seller. However, in the contingent case, in every sub-game followed by an
announcement where κ > 0, NITS uniquely selects the informative equilibrium. We obtain:
Proposition 3 Consider contingent referral fees and suppose that ∆ > 0. In every equilibrium
that satisfies the NITS condition, all the intermediaries refer all their buyers and report their
information truthfully. The seller obtains Π∗ and each intermediary obtains zero.
Proof. We need to show that in every sub-game that follows announcement κ > 0, the only
equilibrium that survives NITS is the informative equilibrium. Clearly, the informative equilibrium
survives NITS. Consider the non-informative equilibrium discussed above; then, for each realized
information t, the payoff of all types (including the worst type) is κiniΠ, which is less than κiniΠ
∗(t),
and strictly less for our chosen “lowest” type. Hence, the non-informative equilibrium fails NITS.
This criterion is satisfied only by the most informative equilibrium.
Hence, under this and the abovementioned selections, we have that when the seller can propose
contingent-referral fees, the seller obtains access to the buyer and to his information at no cost,
and so he extracts Π∗.
Our final observation, which also points to the robustness of selecting the informative equilib-
rium, is that the equilibrium outcome where the seller obtains Π∗ in the sale phase is the unique
outcome if there is an epsilon possibility that the seller interprets the message of the intermediaries
naively–that is, if upon observing messages t, the seller selects an optimal mechanism conditional
on t.7 In this case, given the above assumption on the relevance of the information, reporting a
signal different from his own type (following full referral) is a strictly dominated action for each
intermediary type.
Corollary 1 With contingent fees, at the only robust equilibrium, the seller obtains Π∗.
3 Alternative bargaining protocols
So far, we have assumed that the seller fully controls the referral fee: The seller moves first and
commits to a referral fee schedule. A natural conjecture is that the set of equilibrium payoffs for
the seller and for the intermediaries will change if we reverse the bargaining protocol and we give
intermediaries the power to move first and to commit to referral schedules. We now establish that,
in fact, the set of equilibrium payoffs contains all the payoffs we obtained with the alternative
bargaining scenario.
To illustrate this, we consider the simple case in which there is one intermediary. The timing
of the game is as follows: In the first stage, the intermediary announces a referral schedule to the
seller, who, after observing the announcement, decides whether to accept it or not. If the seller
accepts the proposal, the game moves to the referral stage and eventually to the trade stage, as
described in our benchmark model in Section 1. If the seller rejects the proposed referral schedule,
the game moves directly to the trade stage, as defined in our model of Section 1. Essentially, the
only difference from the model in Section 1 is that, now, the intermediary is the one proposing the
referral schedule.
For the same reason that there is multiplicity in the communication strategy of the intermediary
when the seller proposes, there is also this multiplicity when the intermediary proposes. We now
7This is reminiscent of the model used in Section 4.3 of Chen et al. (2008).
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actually show that there is a continuum of equilibria even for a fixed communication strategy.
As before, we analyze non-contingent and contingent fees and focus on equilibria in which the
intermediary communicates all his information truthfully.
Non-contingent fees
Here, the intermediary asks a payment per buyer referred. The highest possible fee per buyer
κ that will be accepted at an equilibrium where the intermediary communicates truthfully is
κ∗ = nκ = Π∗ −Π = ∆, (1)
where n stands for the intermediary’s expected number of buyers.
Proposition 4 There is a class of equilibria where all the buyers are referred and all the interme-
diaries report their information to the seller truthfully: In these equilibria, the intermediary’s total
payoff comes from referrals and is K∗ ∈ [0,∆], and the seller’s payoff is Π∗ −K∗.
The intermediary proposes κ∗, and the seller accepts κ∗ and rejects all other referral proposals.
Given acceptance, the intermediary always refers his buyer and sends a truthful message if κ = κ∗;
otherwise, the message is uninformative.
Contingent fees
Here, the fee is a fraction of the revenue that the seller generates from the referred buyers. If
the intermediary is proposing a referral fee that is a fraction of revenue κ, the highest possible κ
that will be accepted at an equilibrium where the intermediary communicates truthfully is such
that
κ∗Π∗ = ∆. (2)
Proposition 5 With contingent fees, there is an equilibrium in which all buyers are referred and
the intermediary reports truthfully. The intermediary obtains a payoff of K∗ = ∆ and the seller a
payoff of Π∗−∆ = Π. This equilibrium is Pareto dominant and is the only one that survives NITS.
Suppose that the seller accepts any fee associated with referral paymentsK∗ ∈ [0,∆] and expects
the intermediary to be truthful. Then, following arguments analogous to the ones we used before,
it is easy to see that it is a best response for the intermediary to refer his buyer truthfully and to
propose a fee equal to ∆ for all types. Given this intermediary’s strategy, the seller’s acceptance
strategy is a best response.
Combining the case in which the intermediary proposes non-contingent referral fees, Proposi-
tion 4, with the case in which the seller has the power to propose a non-contingent referral fee,
Proposition 1, we conclude that the feasible equilibrium payoffs coincide in these cases. For the
case of contingent fees, we see, however, that at the Pareto dominant equilibrium, the informational
rent ∆ goes entirely to the party that proposes, so it goes to the seller if the seller proposes, while
it goes to the intermediary when the intermediary proposes.
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Appendix C to “Selling Through Referrals”: An example with
referrals and intermediated trade when the intermediary proposes
Daniele Condorelli, Andrea Galeotti and Vasiliki Skreta
April 30, 2013
In this appendix, we develop an example of an equilibrium in which intermediated trade and
referrals co-exist. As in our illustrative example developed in Section 2, we consider the example
with one seller, one intermediary and one buyer with vB ∈ {vL, vH}. The intermediary knows the
value of the buyer and proposes the referral fees. For simplicity, we let vH = 1 and f = 1/2.
Let f(κ) be the posterior beliefs of the seller that the intermediary is of type vB = vH given the
announcement κ.
The equilibrium we construct has the feature that each intermediary type randomizes between
two referral fees, and the seller accepts each of the proposed fees with positive probability, but
not with probability 1. Hence, in this equilibrium, with positive probability, we do not enter the
referral stage.
Consider the following strategy profile.
• The intermediary with type vB = vH announces κ1 with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) and κ2 with
probability 1−ρ; the intermediary with type vB = vL announces κ1 with probability q ∈ (0, 1)
and κ2 with probability 1− q; κ1 > κ2.
• The seller rejects with probability 1 all proposals κ /∈ {κ1, κ2}; the seller accepts κ1 with
probability η ∈ (0, 1) and accepts κ2 with probability µ ∈ (0, 1).
• Seller posteriors are: f(κ1) = ρ/(ρ + q), f(κ2) = (1 − ρ)/(2 − ρ − q) and f(κ) = 1, if
κ /∈ {κ1, κ2}.
1
• If we enter the referral stage, then the intermediary refers all his buyers regardless of his type.
• When we enter the trading phase, the seller chooses a revenue-maximizing mechanism. More-
over, whenever we enter the trading phase because κ1 has been rejected and in the revenue-
maximizing mechanism the seller is indifferent between asking the intermediary a price vL
and a price vH , then he chooses a price vL with probability γ ∈ (0, 1).
We now find the equilibrium conditions for the proposed profile to be an equilibrium. These
conditions determine restrictions on the primitives. We then show that these restrictions can be
satisfied generically.
Step 1: Referral fee proposal. First, the intermediary, regardless of vB, will never propose
κ /∈ {κ1, κ2}. Indeed, if an intermediary with type vB proposes κ /∈ {κ1, κ2}, the seller will reject
this proposal and, in the trading phase, will ask a price p = vH from the intermediary because the
1The former two expressions have been derived using Bayes’ rule given intermediary’s strategy, and the latter
expression is set arbitrarily as Bayes’ rule does not apply given intermediary’s strategy.
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seller’s posteriors place probability 1 on the intermediary having access to a high value buyer–i.e.,
f(κ) = 1 for each κ /∈ {κ1, κ2}.
Second, consider the intermediary with buyer vB = vL. Note that upon rejection of κ ∈ {κ1, κ2},
an intermediary obtains zero payoff, because the seller will ask a price that is at least vL in the
trading phase. Moreover, if the seller accepts κ ∈ {κ1, κ2}, then the intermediary will refer his
buyer and receive the referral fee. At that point, the seller will extract his information about the
buyer’s type at no cost (as we saw in Section 2). So, if intermediary vB = vL proposes κ1, his
expected payoff is the expected referral payment ηκ1, whereas if he proposes κ2, he gets µκ2. Since
the intermediary with buyer vB = vL is indifferent between the two proposals, q ∈ (0, 1), we must
have:
ηκ1 = µκ2. (1)
Third, consider now the intermediary with vB = vH . If he proposes κ1, he gets κ1 if the proposal
is accepted, which happens with probability η; and if the proposal is rejected, he gets a profit from
buying and reselling whenever the seller asks a price p = vL. Formally, the expected profit by
proposing κ1 is
ηκ1 + (1− η)(vH − vL) Pr[pI = vL|κ1, R],
where Pr[pI = vL|k1, R] is the probability that the seller will ask the intermediary a price vL given
that the seller has rejected κ1. Similarly, if the intermediary proposes κ2, then he gets
µκ2 + (1− µ)(vH − vL) Pr[pI = vL|κ2, R].
Since the intermediary is indifferent between the two proposals, ρ ∈ (0, 1), it must be the case that
ηκ1 + (1− η)(vH − vL) Pr[pI = vL|κ1, R] = µκ2 + (1− µ)(vH − vL) Pr[pI = vL|κ2, R],
and given condition 1, we obtain
(1− η) Pr[pI = vL|κ1, R] = (1− µ) Pr[pI = vL|κ2, R]. (2)
Step 2: Acceptance/Rejection of announced referral fee. First, when the seller receives
proposal κ /∈ {κ1, κ2}, he believes that the intermediary has access to a high-value buyer, and so
by rejecting the proposal and asking a price p = vH , he expects to get a payoff of vH . This is the
highest payoff he can get, and so rejecting is a best reply.
Second, if the proposal is κ1 and the seller accepts, then the intermediary will refer his buyer
for sure, and the seller will extract his information for free. Hence, the expected payoff of the seller
accepting κ1 is










where, recall, that vH = 1 and that f(κ1) = ρ/(ρ + q) is the posterior of the seller that the
intermediary has access to a high-value buyer given announcement κ1. If the seller rejects the offer
κ1, then he will ask a price p = vL from the intermediary if (1 − f(κ1))vL < f(κ1); he will ask a
price p = vH from the intermediary if (1− f(κ1))vL > f(κ1); if (1− f(κ1))vL = f(κ1), he will ask
a price p = vL with probability γ ∈ [0, 1]; and with the remaining probability, he will ask a price
p = vH . Our construction here imposes that the way in which intermediaries randomize between κ1
and κ2, is such that, upon rejecting κ1, the seller is indifferent between charging p = vL or charging
p = vH . Formally, we require that the probabilities ρ and q are such that,







Assuming that condition 3 holds, we have that the expected profit of the seller, by rejecting proposal
κ1, is simply vL. Since the seller must be indifferent between accepting and rejecting κ1, we have









vL − κ1 = vL. (4)
Third, if the proposal is κ2 and the seller accepts, then the intermediary will refer his buyer for
certain, and the seller will extract his information for free. Hence, by accepting κ2, the expected
payoff of the seller is










where, recall, that vH = 1 and that f(κ2) = (1 − ρ)/(2 − ρ − q) is the posterior of the seller that
the intermediary has access to a high-value buyer given announcement κ2. If the seller rejects the
offer κ2, then he will ask a price p = vL from the intermediary if (1− f(κ2))vL ≤ f(κ2), and he will
ask a price p = vH from the intermediary if (1− f(κ2))vL > f(κ2). Our construction here imposes
that the way in which intermediaries randomize between κ1 and κ2, is such that, upon rejecting
κ2, the seller strictly prefers to charge p = vL. Formally, we require that the probabilities ρ and q
are such that,






Assuming that condition 5 holds, we have that the expected profit of the seller, by rejecting proposal
κ2, is simply vL. Since the seller must be indifferent between accepting and rejecting κ2, we have









vL − κ2 = vL. (6)
In summary, for the strategy profile described above to be an equilibrium, there must exist
κ1 > κ2 ≥ 0, ρ ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ (0, 1), η ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1), so that conditions 1, 2, 3,
4, 5 and 6 are mutually satisfied. We now construct such an equilibrium. We can summarize these
equilibrium conditions as follows:
• Condition 1–i.e., ηκ1 = µκ2








• Condition 3 implies that Pr[pI = vL|κ1, R] = γ, and condition 5 implies that Pr[pI =
vL|κ2, R] = 1. Therefore, we can rewrite condition 2 as follows:
(1− η)γ = (1− µ).
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• Using condition 3, we can rewrite condition 4 as follows:
κ1 = vL(1− vL).












to hold, it must be the case that ρ = vL1−vL q and that ρ > q. These two conditions are satisfied if,
and only if, vL > 1− vL or, equivalently, vL > 1/2. We now show that the condition that vL > 1/2




and q ∈ (0, (1 − vL)/vL). This assures that 3 and 5 hold and that ρ, q ∈ (0, 1). Then, κ1 and κ2
are determined by the above conditions. Note that, by construction, κ1 > κ2 > 0. We can then fix
η ∈ (0, 1) and µ ∈ (0, 1) so that condition 1 holds–i.e., ηκ1 = µκ2. Since κ1 > κ2, we have that
η < µ, and, therefore, we can always find a γ ∈ (0, 1) so that γ = 1−µ1−η –i.e., we can satisfy condition
(1− η)γ = (1− µ). This completes the construction of the equilibrium.2
2As an example, suppose vL = 3/4, then the following constitutes an equilibrium κ1 = 3/16, κ2 = 1/16, ρ = 3/4,
q = 1/4, and {η, µ, γ} such that η = µ/3 and γ = (1− µ)/(1− η).
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Appendix D to “Selling Through Referrals”: Efficiency of referrals
in a simple example
Daniele Condorelli, Andrea Galeotti and Vasiliki Skreta
April 30, 2013
In this appendix, we show that the agency model is more efficient than the merchant model in
the context of the following example. The seller is connected to two intermediaries, I1 and I2, who
have one buyer each, B1 and B2. The value of B1 is distributed uniformly in [0, t1] and the value
of B2 is distributed uniformly in [0, t2]. I1 knows t1 and I2 knows t2. From the seller’s perspective,
t1 and t2 are identically and independently distributed with support in (0, b] for some real b.
Consider the outcome of pure intermediation first. Since I1 and I2 are symmetric, the seller will
run a symmetric standard auction with reserve price. Because the resale value of Ii is increasing
in ti, we can conclude that I1 will get the object when t1 > t2; otherwise, the object will go to I2.
Then, the winning intermediary Ii will set price ti/2.
Next, consider the outcome under full referral. In this case, the seller acquires information on
t1 and t2 and runs an optimal auction. The optimal auction is constructed in the standard way.
The object will go to the buyer with the highest virtual value, provided that it is above zero. If no
buyer has a virtual value above zero, the object remains unsold. Let v1 and v2 stand for the values
of buyer 1 and 2. The virtual valuation of B1 is 2v − t1 and the virtual valuation of B2 is 2v − t2.
Hence, for values above (t1/2, t2/2), the seller will distort the auction in favor of the weakest buyer
(the buyer with the smallest support of values).
Next, we now show that, for any t1, t2, the equilibrium with full referral is more efficient than
the outcome of pure intermediation, even if the seller were to set a reserve price of zero to the
intermediaries (i.e., even if the seller were not to exploit his market power, thus increasing inef-
ficiencies). This will be sufficient to show that the equilibrium with full referral is more efficient
than the outcome of intermediation, regardless of the distribution of the intermediary types.
Henceforth, without loss of generality let’s assume that t1 > t2. The picture below depicts the
allocation of the object under intermediation and under referral.
The number in the picture indicates the buyer who obtains the object. The diagonal line
v2 = v1 −
1
2(t1 − t2) is given by the solution to the equation 2v1 − t1 = 2v2 − t2. Note that the
allocation under intermediation and under referral can differ only in the two upper quadrants in
the picture. Hence, we can compute the welfare difference between the two outcomes by focusing
on those two regions.


























































where the first term is the surplus in region A of the figure; the second term is the surplus in the
B area, and the third is the surplus in the C area.













Hence, roughly speaking, the loss in efficiency that is due to the absence of buyer 2 is always
larger than the loss in efficiency generated by the distortion in favor of buyer 2 that takes place in
the optimal auction. As we have argued above, this computation assumes that the seller does not
introduce any further distortion under intermediation. In practice, however, the loss in efficiency
under intermediation is even greater than the one we highlight above, as the seller will ultimately
sell to the intermediary with the highest ti, but will exclude some types of the intermediaries from
the auction by using a reserve price.
While we have not explicitly carried out the computations, it is reasonable to assume that, if we
maintain the informational structure above, the result would carry over even in cases where there
are more than two intermediaries, and each intermediary has multiple buyers.
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Figure 2: Intermediation
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